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This Article is dedicated to the memory of Marc Poirier, an inspiring
author and a generous human being.
The property as personhood theory provides a dominant justification for
legal theory and has shaped numerous legal doctrines. Although the theory has
been criticized by many scholars, one important concern has escaped scholars
thus far. Property as personhood limits identity and confines growth. The
concept allows little room for experimenting with personality and testing one’s
lifestyle. Access, a rising form of property use in the sharing economy, provides
an important alternative. It allows for property use without personhood,
emphasizing choice, flexibility and mobility. This Article presents this
alternative and explains its significance to property legal theory contra the
property as personhood theory. It also details the benefits and costs associated
with property without personhood, and sketches out possible legal implications.
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INTRODUCTION
Property and personhood are intimately linked in modern legal
Controlling property through possession manifests
thinking.1
2
Possession contributes to self-development and
individuality.
manifests identity.3 Ownership connotes stability.4 Property is often
justified based on its role in connecting a person to her past and future
and communicating her identity.5 Our home, car, books, furniture,
and even toys reflect who we are to our friends and neighbors.6
Yet, alongside this description, property as shaping or reflecting
identity comes at a price. We stand the risk of fetishizing property and
reducing our identity to mere items.7 We risk being judged by what we
have rather than who we are.8 To these familiar critiques, this Article
adds a neglected risk: property as personhood limits our options and

1

ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN
JURISPRUDENCE 34–38 (1995); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 352
(reprinted 2002); Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982); Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to
the Public Domain – With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1392, 1397–1406 (1993); Jeffery Douglas Jones, Property as Personhood
Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 93 (2011); Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin
Territory: Margaret Radin’s Imagery of Personal Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79
MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277
(1998). Cf. the analysis of cultural property in Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property
Claim Within the Same Sex Marriage Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343 (2008).
2
G. W. F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1967); WALDRON,
supra note 1. See also Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45,
56–57 (1983).
3
Radin, supra note 1.
4
See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 102 (2007).
5
See supra note 1.
6
Cf. Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L.
REV. 61 (2015) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property].
7
Radin, supra note 1, at 961 (“Property is damnation as well as salvation, objectfetishism as well as moral groundwork.”).
8
Compare the role of property as conveying relative status in Nestor M.
Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 768 (2008) (internal
quotations omitted) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291–92
(2007) (1890)) (“[I]t is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls
mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours
very much as we feel and act about ourselves . . . .”).
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confines our growth.9
The concept allows little room for
experimenting with our personality and testing our lifestyle. This
Article further argues that the sharing economy,10 and the access
revolution it has inspired, create an alternative property use: property
without personhood.
Access allows consumers to use assets on a casual basis instead of
purchasing unnecessary objects.11 People choose to access cars casually
on an as-needed basis rather than own or lease a vehicle.12 Some users
would rather borrow or rent a drill and not buy one, only to use it twice
a year. Indeed, among the reported advantages of access are saving
costs and promoting sustainability.13 Moreover, consumer researchers
have suggested that access symbolizes flexibility, mobility, and
openness to change.14 Much like property as personhood, we may
conclude, access is a choice that communicates the identity of the user.
People who choose access do not seek stability, but prefer a more
casual lifestyle.15 However, we should proceed with caution. It is easy
to attribute personality traits to consumer choices.16 This view tends to
9

See infra Part I.B.4.
On the sharing economy, see RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS
YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010). See Alice Witt et al.,
Regulating Ride-Sharing in the Peer Economy, 1 COMM. RES. & PRAC. 174 (2015); Rashmi
Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241 (2015) [hereinafter Dyal-Chand,
Regulating Sharing]; Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local
Governmental Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” (Geo. Mason
L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 15-01, 2015); Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean
Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413
(2015); Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up
Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16 (2015); Kellen Zale,
Sharing Property, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). See also BETH BUCZYNSK, SHARING
IS GOOD: HOW TO SAVE MONEY, TIME AND RESOURCES THROUGH COLLABORATIVE
CONSUMPTION (2013).
11
Examples of access-based projects are TURO, www.turo.com (last visited Feb. 22,
2017); NEIGHBORGOODS, www.neighborgoods.net (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); and
PEERBY, www.peerby.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
12
ZipCar and Car2Go offer customers short-term rentals cars owned by a
commercial company. Turo is a peer-to-peer market that allows private owners to rent
out their cars. See Jörg Firnkorn & Martin Müller, Selling Mobility instead of Cars: New
Business Strategies of Automakers and the Impact on Private Vehicle Holding, 21 BUS. STRATEGY
& ENV’T 264 (2011).
13
Cait Poynor Lamberton & Randall L. Rose, When Is Ours Better Than Mine? A
Framework for Understanding and Altering Participation in Commercial Sharing Systems, 76 J.
MARKETING 109 (2012).
14
Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 890 (2012).
15
Cf. Fleura Bardhi et al., Liquid Relationship to Possessions, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 510
(2012).
16
See, e.g., Russell Belk, You are what you can access: Sharing and collaborative
consumption online, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1595 (2014) [hereinafter Belk, You are what you can
10
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be reductionist. The argument in this Article is more nuanced, namely
that access allows users to experiment and push the boundaries of their
engagements with property. When someone chooses to buy or lease
an asset, s/he might consider the reflection of this choice on his/her
identity or its perception by the community.17 On the other hand, if
one only accesses this asset, there is no financial commitment, and
there is more room to experiment.18 Toy lending libraries make a good
example. When children do not buy a toy, but instead exchange toys
frequently, boys are willing to try toys normally associated with girls.19
There is more openness to experimenting with property.20
Ownership’s stability is limiting, while access has a liberating
component.21
This aspect of ownership and possession has yet to be considered
by property legal theory. The claim is not an attack on ownership or
the vision of property as personhood per se.22 The goal is to highlight
alternatives. The existence of alternatives, facilitated by the rise of the
sharing economy, allows users to evaluate their choices and question
the role of property as personhood in their lives.23 Moreover, stability
and attachment become more meaningful when there is also an
opportunity to experiment. For this reason, this Article argues that the
law should protect access as an option, and the ability to choose it. At
certain points in one’s life, access will be the most effective lifestyle
choice. People may desire flexibility and mobility when they are
younger and prefer stability as they get older. In addition, some
individuals will combine attachment and stability with a certain level of
flexibility. The law should support these choices.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I presents the importance of
personhood and stability in property legal theory and its influence on
legal doctrines. It will then consider the various critiques of the
property as personhood approach. Part II depicts the rise of access,
and considers the economic and cultural factors leading to its
newfound prominence. It will also consider the role of access in
allowing people to experiment with their identity and push the
access]; Russell Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988)
[hereinafter Belk, Extended Self].
17
See Davidson, supra note 8.
18
See infra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
19
See Lucie K. Ozanne & Paul W. Ballantine, Sharing as a form of anti-consumption?
An examination of toy library users, 9 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 485, 489 (2010).
20
Id.
21
See infra Part II.B.1.
22
See infra Part I.
23
See infra Part II.
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boundaries of their personhood, as well as the normative difficulties of
choosing access. Part III introduces general recommendations for
legal reform and explicates, in very broad strokes, the importance of
legal support of property without personhood. Finally, Part IV offers
concluding remarks.
I. PROPERTY, PERSONHOOD AND STABILITY
A. The Approach
The role of property in supporting, shaping or recognizing
personhood begins with Hegel’s theory of person.24 Hegel’s person
starts as an abstract unit of will, which becomes a concrete individual
by controlling an external object.25 It is not property in itself but the
control of property by a person that makes one an individual.26 This
argument does not distinguish among types of property: it is the
control of an asset, recognized by the community, that supports
personhood.27 It is through the recognition of others that one
recognizes herself.28 The right-holder is understood as a sovereign,
exerting power, and is thus constituted as a concrete being.29
Moreover, according to Jeremy Waldron, engaging with property has
an important temporal aspect, as “the actions that an individual
performs on or with the object now may constrain or determine the
actions that he can perform on or with it later.”30 Property embodies
will by forcing the individual to become consistent and stable over
time.31
The general concept of property’s role in the achievement of
personhood is twofold. First, people define themselves at least partly
by what they have.32 When a person changes an object, structures or
uses it, according to the claim, she cements her identity in the object.
She has to acknowledge her responsibility when she changes the
property, since the process is irreversible.33 Second, objects tell us
something about their owner: they reveal her likes and dislikes, her

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

See HEGEL, supra note 2.
BRUDNER, supra note 1.
WALDRON, supra note 1.
Id.
See Knowles, supra note 2.
See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 377–78.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Cf. Davidson, supra note 8.
See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 364–65.
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tastes and preferences,34 her status in life35 or the choices she has made.
Our property says something about us to the world and, at the same
time, helps us shape an image of ourselves. For example, consider
personal possessions, such as clothes, books, and furniture. These
objects allow owners to project personality outwards and structure
their own experiences inwards.
Margaret Radin has stressed in her seminal work the attachment
of subject to an object. Possession of certain objects contributes to
achieving self-development.36 She distinguishes between fungible
assets that do not warrant special protection and personhood property,
which suggests “a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”37
However, the subjective assessment is accompanied by a normative
judgment. A fully developed theory of property as personhood
embodies a normative evaluation that separates the fetish from
attachments. Indeed, Radin is well aware of the duality that lies in
property relations. She explains:
Property is damnation as well as salvation, object-fetishism as
well as moral groundwork. In this view, the relationship
between the shoe fetishist and his shoe will not be respected
like that between the spouse and her wedding ring. At the
extreme, anyone who lives only for material objects is
considered not to be a well-developed person, but rather to
be lacking some important attribute of humanity.38
The Radinian approach is not abstract; it engages with particular
types of property that contribute to self-development. A key example
is the home. According to Radin, the home is closely connected to
personhood because it is the “scene of one’s history and future, one’s
life and growth.”39 The car is also part of the same list, as cars are “the
repository of personal effects, and cars form the backdrop for carrying
on private thoughts or intimate relationships, just as homes do.”40
Radin’s perception of property is non-formalist. Her argument
highlights the value of continuing possession as the foundation for
personhood. She does not focus on formal property rights, but on
people’s engagement with property. Personhood is not attributable to

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

See Knowles, supra note 2, at 56–57.
See Pollack, supra note 1, at 1397–1406.
Radin, supra note 1.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 1001.
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ownership per se, but to people’s attachment to objects. Accordingly,
she argues that housing should not be treated as an ordinary market
commodity.41 Occupational rights of tenants are to be characterized
as personhood property, and the ownership rights of landlords are
fungible property.42
The property as personhood approach has proven remarkably
influential in American property law. It is not only central to the study
of modern property theory,43 but has also played a leading role in
shaping legal doctrines. Based on the personhood interest in the
home, Radin and others argue for strong protection of privacy rights
in residential property,44 and in favor of rent control protection.45 In
addition, different scholars advocate for the protection of the home
from involuntary dislocation, relying on the role of the home in
building identity and well-being.46 The personhood approach has
been supported by empirical work. The home, according to these
studies, creates a sense of belonging, permanence, and continuity.47 It
allows the individual to know where she is located.48 Alongside its
individual meanings, the home is also a locus of relationships. It
41

Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 351
(1986) [hereinafter Radin, Residential Rent Control].
42
Id. at 960, 993.
43
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY 57–69 (2012); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTIES
OF PROPERTY (2012); see STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 82 (1990); Nestor
M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 447–48 (2011).
44
Radin, supra note 1, at 996–1002; Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The Costs of the Fourth
Amendment: Home Searches and Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009). See
discussion and critique in Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing
Exceptionalism and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2010) [hereinafter
Stern, The Inviolate Home]. Cf. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 256, 259 (2006).
45
Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 41.
46
For a general critique, see Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the
Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2009) [hereinafter Stern,
Residential Protectionism]. See also Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home Dwellers:
Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 285 (2006) (defining
the home as a space for developing identity); Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home”: A ReAnalysis of Gender, Homeownership and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 434 (2008) [hereinafter Fox, Re-Possessing Home] (“The
impact of losing one’s home on an individual occupier’s quality of life, social and
identity status, personal and family relationships, and for his or her emotional,
psychological, and physical health and well-being have been well-established in
housing and health literature.”); Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept
or a Legal Challenge?, 29 J.L. SOC’Y 580 (2002) [hereinafter Fox, The Meaning of Home].
47
Fox, The Meaning of Home, supra note 46; Judith Sixsmith, The Meaning of Home:
an Exploratory Study of Environmental Experience, 6 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 281 (1986).
48
Fox, The Meaning of Home, supra note 46, at 593.
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functions as a social and cultural unit of interaction. The home enables
interactions with others, either as guests, neighbors, the people one
lives with,49 or even pets.50
Furthermore, intellectual property scholars have also relied on
personhood theories to justify the protection of intellectual property
as a property institution,51 and to support the moral standing of
copyright.52 For example, Roberta Kwall argues that artistic work
reflects the author’s meaning and “an embodiment of her message.”53
Other notable examples include the ongoing discussion
regarding property interests in the human body,54 and the
conceptualization of inheritance and succession that stresses the
importance of preserving intergenerational connections.55
To sum up, personhood theory has played a key role in the
analysis of various legal problems. Its influence on American legal
thought is significant. Yet property’s role in supporting long-term
goals for individuals reaches beyond attachment to possessions.
Property connotes stability. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky
argue that property is a mechanism for protecting stable ownership
value.56 Owner’s control and the right to exclude preserve the owner’s
idiosyncratic values and bargaining position.57 Property law achieves

49

Sixsmith, supra note 47; Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qualities of a Home, 14 J.
ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 31, 39 (1994). See also Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A Critical
Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 62, 68 (2004).
50
Smith, supra note 49, at 37.
51
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
52
Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 795, 845 (2001) (“Conceptually, the dignity-based right of integrity is a personal
right, one that demands respect for the author’s person (and the person’s artist), her
personhood, and inviolate personality, as reflected in her creation. All of these interests
must be said to terminate with the death of the author.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive
Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (“Another group of
scholars reasons instead that creators deserve moral rights in their works . . . because
the works are important components of creators’ personhoods (the aspects of
creators’ personalities infused into and bound up in their works).”).
53
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 25 (2010).
54
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000);
Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right in Human
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849 (1987).
55
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Can One Inherit a Home as Opposed to a House? A Normative
and Comparative Perspective, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 735 (2014); Karen J. Sneddon,
The Will as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355 (2013).
56
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4.
57
Id.
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stability for owners and for third parties.58 To conclude, then, property
connects people to their community by providing a means for selfidentification, growth and stability. However, as we shall see, this
important role limits the possibility of changing, experimenting and
living a flexible lifestyle.
B. Personhood’s Critiques
Although the property as personhood approach is undoubtedly
central, it has also drawn significant criticism. These critiques are
diverse and range from disputing its core rationale59 to concerns over
its social implications.60 This section reviews the most notable
objections and then adds a new concern regarding the growth and
development of identity.61
1. Psychological Validity
Stephanie Stern questions the validity of the personhood claim
and challenges the endorsement of its insights.62 She claims there is a
panoply of laws designed to protect or increase the likelihood “that an
owner can retain her residential real estate despite creditor claims,
government eminent domain action, or market fluctuations.”63 She
critically refers to this array of protections as “residential
protectionism.”64 Stern disputes the moral status of these protections,
forcefully arguing that there is little evidence from psychological
research to support the argument that the home constructs identity.65
According to her survey, evidence show that personality traits, values,
social role and the body are more connected to the self than
possessions.66 Moreover, she reclassifies property and maintains that
the home is less connected to the self than diaries, pictures, old letters
and heirlooms.67 This finding does not disprove the relevance of the
approach, but deflects attention away from the home. In addition,
Stern argues that people do not always prefer personhood property to
58

Id. See also Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 4 (arguing that property law achieves
stability but highlighting the role of lawbreakers in undermining stability and fostering
the evolution of property).
59
See infra Part II.B.1.
60
See infra Parts I.B.2–I.B.4.
61
See infra Part I.B.4.
62
Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46.
63
Id. at 1100.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1110.
67
Id. at 1111.
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fungible property such as money.68 Finally, Stern argues that property
does not construct identity but rather expresses identity and even
maintains it.69 Indeed, “[h]omes and other possessions express
attitudes, values, personal history, ethnic identity, and self-perceived
status, or bolster an image of self we wish to convey to others.”70 Yet
this reflective function does not justify legal protection. Considering
the social costs,71 Stern concludes that ongoing control over the home
is not a prerequisite for psychological flourishing.72
This argument does not negate the personhood approach
altogether, but stresses the dynamic nature of attachment.73 It seeks to
overturn the claims against displacement. It maintains that people
change and replace property frequently and the home cannot be seen
as a rigid and sacred category. Jeffery Douglas Jones reinforces this
conclusion from a different perspective. He argues that attachment to
possession is so abundant that there is no need of legal possession.74
Everything is personal property, and things kept and things lost are
part of the circle of life.75
2. Pragmatism and Values
Stephen Schnably criticizes Radin’s pragmatist focus on
consensus as the foundation for property as personhood.76 He makes
two important claims. First, he argues that there is never any true
consensus.77 A search for consensus merely obscures relevant
controversies. Radin’s assertion that the home allows for selfconstitution ignores the historical context of the home as a middleclass suburban artifact.78 According to Schnably, this perception
rejects the importance of the public sphere in favor of private life,
constitutes women’s role as homemakers, and excludes non-nuclear

68

Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46, at 1112.
Id.
70
Id. at 1113.
71
Id. at 1095.
72
Id. at 1096.
73
Id. at 1114.
74
See Jeffery Douglas Jones, Property as Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL’Y 93 (2011).
75
Id.
76
Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 373–74 (1993). Cf. Richard Thompson
Ford, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood: A Review of Margaret Jane Radin’s
Reinterpreting Property, 48 STAN. L. REV. 217 (1995).
77
Schnably, supra note 76, at 363.
78
Id. at 365.
69
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families.79
His second claim is that it is impossible to follow a consensus
without constituting it at the same time.80 Indeed, “what we as a society
choose to recognize and protect as personal inevitably affects
subsequent choices by individuals of how and where to embody
themselves.”81 For this reason
[t]he ideal of the home is not one simply constructed by
individuals, but is one that has been actively fostered by the
state and other ‘private’ actors wielding significant social
power . . . [s]ince the law itself often shapes consensus,
purporting to rely on consensus to shape the law is a
dangerous exercise in circularity.82
While Stern’s critique focused on the validity of Radin’s
argument, Schnably is more concerned with its normative strength. It
is a meta-critique about legal theory’s struggle to grapple with social
conventions and ideals. More importantly, it provides a skeptical take
on pragmatism and universalism.83 His argument directs our attention
to the power embedded in social structures, and to the winners and
losers of current property regimes.
3. Relative Status
The role of property as reflecting and shaping identity is intricate.
If property communicates a vision of the self, then it becomes a vehicle
for communicating messages of status, and in particular relative
status.84 Attachment to material possessions draws, at least partly, on
comparison to others.85 Property thus marks and reinforces economic,
social and cultural hierarchies.86 A comparison to other people “may
over-incentivize the production of, or investment in, status-related
resources.”87 This potential interrelation between personhood and
possessions may fuel competitive consumption.88 Although it does not
fall within the category of property fetish,89 communicating status is
79

Id. at 365–66.
Id. at 363.
81
Id. at 371–72.
82
Id. at 374–75.
83
Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45
STAN. L. REV. 409 (1993).
84
See Davidson, supra note 8.
85
See id.
86
Id. at 760–61.
87
Id. at 762.
88
Id. at 799–800.
89
Radin, supra note 1, at 961.
80
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reductionist. Instead of bolstering self-development, it has the
potential to distort identity and personality.90 The identity-signaling
function of property has given rise to a countermovement, supporting
ecological and anti-consumerist motivations that steer away from
ownership as a source of personal meaning.91 Because relative status is
tied up with consumption, it drives an anti-consumerist rebuttal, which
manifests itself in, among other things, the rise of access.92
4. Growth and Change
This Article identifies an additional risk that the conflation of
property and identity creates. Attachment to possessions is inherently
restrictive.
It connects the individual to a particular setting,
geographically and personally, making it harder for the individual to
move and change environments. The more property people have, the
more tied down they are to a particular time, place and community.93
Because ownership is associated with stability and security,94 it might
result in limiting choices.
The ability to change one’s life story, to develop goals and adapt
new points of view is an essential component of the liberal
understanding of autonomy.95 Property as personhood and stability
creates barriers to change. In order to move, one needs to sell
property and buy new things. Of course, property can be sold and
bought, as exchange is the foundation of our economic system.96 Yet
transactions are costly and cumbersome, and offer less flexibility than
90

Davidson, supra note 8, at 762.
See KIM HUMPHERY, EXCESS: ANTI-CONSUMERISM IN THE WEST (2013).
92
See id.
93
See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).
94
Lynda Cheshire et al., The Politics of Housing Consumption: Renters as Flawed
Consumers on a Master Planned Estate, 47 URB. STUD. 2597, 2599 (2010) (suggesting that
ownership promotes ontological security). Cf. Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A
Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 62, 66 (2004) (arguing that governments
promote homeownership as creating stability in order to shift the burden of welfare to
the family). It has similarly been suggested that home ownership ideology promotes
a property-based citizenship, privileging home ownership over public and rental
housing. See RICHARD RONALD, THE IDEOLOGY OF HOME OWNERSHIP: HOMEWORKER
SOCIETIES AND THE ROLE OF HOUSING (2008).
95
WENDY DONNER, THE LIBERAL SELF: JOHN STUART MILL’S MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 92–94, 118 (1991); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (David Spitz ed.,
1975) (1859); John L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and
Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 570–71 (2004); Anthony T. Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contract, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 780–83 (1983).
96
Compare Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. &
ECON. 11 (1964); GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989), with
BRUDNER, supra note 1, at 56 (explaining that according to Hegel, exchange involves
the recognition of the other’s personhood).
91
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nonmaterial assets.97 Financial means are different from material
possession because they are culturally understood as representing
liquidity and choice.98
This critique will be at the focus of this Article, along with the rise
of access in the sharing economy. However, the Article does not
challenge the cultural, social and economic validity of property as
personhood. On the contrary, it is because property is understood as
an expression of the self that it becomes limiting. Recognizing access
as a form of property use will allow individuals to experiment with their
preferences and narrow the role of property in constructing or
projecting their identity.
Moreover, stability and coherence are important traits of
property, but they contribute to a certain lifestyle and relational
choices. Mobility and flexibility are alternative choices that require a
different mode of property engagement. These two forms of use can—
and should—coexist to provide an array of choices for individuals.
II. THE RISE OF ACCESS
A. Access: Definition and Background
Access is a form of casual use that is detached from the asset
itself.99 Access breaks the connection between use and possession. The
use value of property, its function, is produced without committing to
continued use of one particular article.100 This definition of access is
different from two kindred uses of the term. First, Jeremey Rifkin uses
access to refer to the structure of a new business model in his influential
book, The Age of Access.101 Rifkin argues that ownership of market goods
97

Cf. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17–24 (1982).
Christine Desan, Coin Reconsidered: The Political Alchemy of Commodity Money, 11
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 361 (2010) (discussing liquidity as the unique quality that
sets money apart from a commodity); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF
MONEY 149 (1997) (discussing the liberating power of money to inspire choice).
99
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access (Feb. 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access]; see
also supra note 11.
100
See Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, in THE MARX ENGELS READER 221, 256–57 (Robert
C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). See also Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1369 (2011) [hereinafter Dyal-Chand, Useless Property]; Peñalver, Land Virtues,
supra note 93; Lee Ann Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008)
(discussing homeownership as consumption and investment). Cf. Avihay Dorfman,
The Normativity of the Private Ownership Form, 75 MOD. L. REV. 981, 983 (2012) (“[W]hile
the owner holds the (arguably) legitimate right to use her object, to the exclusion of
others, she can also exclude simply for the sake of excluding others with no necessary
reference to use, even potential use, at all.”).
101
JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM,
98
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has become outdated in the new network economy: “markets are
making ways for networks and ownership is steadily being replaced by
access.”102 Exchange of ownership cannot adapt to rapid technological
advances, information flows and human creativity. Short-term access
through lease, rent, subscriptions, or memberships is flexible but also
creates attachments to commercial brands.103 When a dealer sells a car
to a buyer, their relationship is limited; it often ends with the sale. If
the client gains access to the car in the form of a lease, the relationship
is ongoing.104 It becomes what Rifkin terms “a commodifying
relationship.”105 Consequently, “[w]hen everyone is embedded in
commercial networks of one sort or another and in continuous
association by way of paid leases, partnerships, subscriptions and
retainer fees, all time is commercial time.”106
Nonetheless, Rifkin discusses a possibly perpetual relationship
between a commercial company and a consumer.107 In many ways,
access as identified by Rifkin almost fifteen years ago essentially takes
the form of long-term engagement with assets and brands that lacks a
formal ownership component.108 This access also lacks the consumer’s
control over the asset, making consumers more vulnerable and less
powerful.109 Access as depicted in this Article relates to more casual
and detached relations to property. It mostly concerns individuals
seeking either to lower the costs of consumption or to make use of
excess capacity.110
Second, this definition of access is also distinguishable from the
familiar understanding of open-access resources.
Open-access
concerns resources that can be claimed and used by everyone.111 Openaccess resources have important social and environmental value.112
WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE (2000).
102
Id. at 4.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 10.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
RIFKIN, supra note 101, at 10.
108
Id. at 98 (discussing the new economy’s goal, which is not to sell the product to
many clients but to sell many products to one client).
109
Id. at 6.
110
See, e.g., Gabriel H. Mugar, A Practice Perspective on Websites for the Sharing Economy,
ICONF. PROC. 738 (2012); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004).
111
Peter Ekbäck, Private, Common, and Open Access Property Rights in Land – An
Investigation of Economic Principles and Legislation, 6 NORDIC J. SURVEYING & REAL EST. RES.
57, 59 (2009).
112
Daniel Mishori, Reclaiming Commons Rights: Resources, Public Ownership and the
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Certain resources, such as beaches and open spaces, are “inherently
public.”113 Open-access to public resources is very different from the
option of access that this Article analyzes. Access allows individuals to
constantly replace assets, use them casually, and move on to the next
object. In contrast, open-access concerns the use of one common pool
of resources114 which typically are not easily distributed to private
individuals, such as beaches, open spaces, water, and so on.115 The
literature references public access to public or quasi-public resources,
not everyday goods.116 Access as a form of flexibility and choice, as
portrayed in this Article, is not about regulating public resources.
Rather, it is about the individual’s use and enjoyment of personal
assets.
Access as a distinct form of casual use is rooted in two important
developments: the sharing economy and global nomadism.117 The
sharing economy is a modern form of consumption based on
collaboration in the use, production, or creation of products and
services.118 Rauch & Schleicher define it as a “stark reduction in
transaction costs that allows for radically disaggregated
consumption.”119 The sharing economy is actually an umbrella term
that covers a wide range of transactions, some of them directly
associated with access. Other sharing economy transactions are not
about access, but serve as a background to changing consumption
modes.
Rights of Future Generations, 8 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 335, 353 (2014) (“[I]t is costly to
exclude individuals from using the good [and] the benefits consumed by one
individual subtract from the benefits available to others.”).
113
See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
114
Cf. Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds.,
2003); S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, ‘Common Property’ as a Concept in
Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975).
115
Rose, supra note 113.
116
See id.
117
For the sharing economy see infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text; for
global nomadism see infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.
118
This review is based in part on Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99.
BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 10; BUCZYNSK, supra note 10; Danielle Sacks, The Sharing
Economy, FAST CO. (Apr. 18, 2011, 1:05 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/
1747551/sharing-economy; Timm Teubner, Thoughts on the Sharing Economy,
RESEARCHGATE,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299812647_Trust_in_the_Sharing_
Economy (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT
TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014), http://www.greattransition.org/publication/
debating-the-sharing-economy.
119
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 10.
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First, the sharing economy allows people to make better use of
their own property. There are certain types of goods that are designed
for private consumption but hold an unutilized excess capacity.120 Cars,
bikes, personal possessions,121 and even a spare room in the home,122
are good examples. The sharing economy allows owners, using new
forms of peer-to-peer markets, to rent out assets such as a car, their
home, a bicycle, or even pets to strangers.123 Second, the sharing
economy also includes cooperative projects such as bike-sharing and
Bike-sharing is becoming increasingly popular
car-sharing.124
worldwide,125 as a healthy way to travel that does not require owning a
bike.126 Providers of bikes for access include governments, quasigovernmental transport agencies, universities, non-profits, and for-

120

Benkler, supra note 110.
Yuliya Chernova, Peer-to-Peer Car Rental Startup RelayRides Hopes to Escape Silicon
Valley Bubble, VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (June 14, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/
venturecapital/2014/06/24/peer-to-peer-car-rental-startup-relayrides-hopes-toescape-silicon-valley-bubble/; How NeighborGoods Works, VIMEO (2010), https://vim
eo.com/10659908 (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
122
Airbnb is a site that allows people to rent out houses for short-term periods.
Tomio Geron, Airbnb And The Unstoppable Rise Of The Share Economy, FORBES (Feb. 11,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unsto
ppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/; Tapio Ikkala & Airi Lampinen, Defining the Price of
Hospitality: Networked Hospitality Exchange via Airbnb, CSCW COMPANION 173 (2014). On
the regulation of Airbnb, see Airbnb in the City, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. ST. N.Y.,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2017);
Julie Bort, Airbnb: 124 New York Airbnb Hosts “May Be Flagrantly Misusing Our Platform”,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-gives-ag-infoon-124-ny-hosts-2014-8. See also Lauren Frayer, Uber, Airbnb Under Attack In Spain As Old
And New Economies Clash, NPR ONLINE (July 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs
/parallels/2014/07/29/327796899/uber-airbnbunder-attack-in-spain-as-old-andnew-economy-clash; Brad Tuttle, 7 Cities Where the Sharing Economy Is Freshly Under
Attack, TIME.COM (June 9, 2014), http://time.com/money/2800742/uber-lyft-airbnbsharingeconomy-city-regulation; Brian Summers, Airbnb’s short-term rentals break law in
Los Angeles, says city memo, DAILY BREEZE (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.dailybreeze.com
/business/20140321/airbnbs-short-term-rentals-break-law-inlos-angeles-says-citymemo.
123
Peer-to-peer (P2P) markets are markets where trade occurs between peers. See,
e.g., Anindya Ghose, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis & Arun Sundararajan, Reputation Premiums
in Peer-to-Peer Markets: Analyzing Textual Feedback and Network Structure, in P2PECON ‘05:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 ACM SIGCOMM WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER
SYSTEMS 150–54 (2005), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1080207.
124
There have been several attempts at bike sharing since the 1960s, but most have
proven unsuccessful in the long-run, until the new “third generation” bike sharing. See
Paul DeMaio, Bike-sharing: History, Impacts, Models of Provision, and Future, 12 J. PUB.
TRANSP. 41 (2009).
125
Oliver O’Brien et al., Mining Bicycle Sharing Data for Generating Insights into
Sustainable Transport Systems, 34 J. TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 262, 262 (2014).
126
Id. at 262.
121
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profits.127 Users include commuters, leisure users who bicycle for fun
and exercise, and tourists.128 A third type of sharing economy
transactions includes lending, bartering, and swapping.129 These
transactions do not include access but instead are about an exchange
of ownership. Fourth, the sharing economy involves neighborhoodbased cooperative endeavors designed to foster trust and
cooperation.130 These include, for example, tool, toy, and clothing
libraries131 and community gardens.132 Fifth, many companies now offer
services that are based on use and access rather than ownership and
possession.133 A sixth example of the sharing economy includes people
who share their time, skills, and expertise.134
All these transactions are becoming prevalent in everyday life.
Notable consumer researchers argue that the rise of collaborative
consumption has led to a decline in the symbolic significance of
ownership,135 and that access-based consumption allows flexibility and
adaptability, creating a different relationship with possession that is
127

DeMaio, supra note 124, at 45.
O’Brien et al., supra note 125, at 262, 267, 269.
129
See generally Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in
Collaborative Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2047 (forthcoming 2016).
130
Christopher D. Cook, Seed Libraries Fight for the Right to Share, SHAREABLE (Feb. 11,
2015), http://www.shareable.net/blog/seed-libraries-fight-for-the-right-to-share; Cat
Johnson, The Tool Library Movement Gains Steam, SHAREABLE (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-tool-library-movement-gains-steam.
131
Johnson, supra note 130 (“[N]o longer just places to get a drill when you need
one . . . [but rather] neighborhood hubs offering classes, community building spaces,
workshops and a variety of tools ranging from belt sanders to lawnmowers and more.”).
132
Efrat Eizenberg, The Changing Meaning of Community Space: Two Models of NGO
Management of Community Gardens in New York City, 36 INT’L J. URB. & REG. RES. 106
(2012); Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local
Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (2000); Joan
Twiss et al., Community Gardens: Lessons Learned From California Healthy Cities and
Communities, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1435 (2003).
133
Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 16. This is particularly common in
the car-sharing business. Automobile manufacturers are buying or starting car-sharing
enterprises such as Zipcar (Avis) and Car2Go (Benz). See also Jörg Firnkorn & Martin
Müller, Selling Mobility Instead of Cars: New Business Strategies of Automakers and the Impact
on Private Vehicle Holding, 21 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 264 (2012) (indicating that the
number of private vehicles is dropping due to consumer preferences).
134
See, e.g., Catherine Lee Rassman, Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation:
Examining the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board, 15
PITTSBURGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81 (2014); Janelle Orsi, The Sharing Economy Just Got
Real, SHAREABLE (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.mayorsinnovation.org/images/upload
s/pdf/3.The_Sharing_Economy_Just_Got_Real.pdf; Brad Stone, My Life as a
TaskRabbit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2012, 4:37 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/new
s/articles/2012-09-13/my-life-as-a-taskrabbit.
135
Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14; Belk, You are what you can access, supra note
16.
128
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termed “liquid.”136
Global nomadism, the voluntary mobility of elite workers that is
“characterized by serial relocations, frequent short-term international
travel, and deterritorialization,”137 has also contributed to the decline
of ownership and attachment to possessions.138 Global mobility has
become a common phenomenon in a globalized world, which builds
on the demand for skilled labor in the global economy.139 Fleura
Bardhi, Giana Eckhardt, and Eric Arnould found global nomads to
have a liquid relationship to possessions that is detached, flexible,
temporal, and situational.140
Globalization and changing consumption modes serve as the
background to the rise of access. This Article focuses on three
performances of access in contemporary society: peer-to-peer access,
community lending libraries, and a mobility-based flexible lifestyle.
Peer-to-peer markets allow owners to rent out personal property
to casual users.141 Users choose to access instead of own. Many types
of property are being rented out, from personal vehicles142 to bikes,
ladders, and lawnmowers.143 One can even casually spend time with a
dog via BorrowMyDoggy; users can therefore choose to use John’s car
today and Jane’s car next week.144
A more communal form of access to property is found in
community lending libraries. For example, toy lending libraries allow
children and their parents to borrow toys, games, and puzzles.145
Instead of buying toys, a child exchanges toys every few weeks.146
Parents typically assist the librarian and enjoy joint activities.147
Tool libraries allow people to borrow various tools, and
occasionally serve as a common working space.148 Clothing libraries
136

Bardhi et al., supra note 15.
Bardhi et al., supra note 15, at 2.
138
Id.
139
Aihwa Ong, Please Stay: Pied-a-Terre Subjects in the Megacity, 11 CITIZENSHIP STUD.
83 (2007); JOHN URRY, MOBILITIES (2007).
140
Bardhi et al., supra note 15, at 2.
141
See Ghose, supra note 123.
142
See GET AROUND INC., https://www.getaround.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2017);
JUSTSHAREIT, www.justshareit.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2017); TURO, https://www.turo.
com (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
143
See NEIGHBORGOODS, www.neighborgoods.net (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
144
BORROW MY DOGGY, www.borrowmydoggy.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
145
Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19, at 488.
146
Id.
147
See, e.g., KARORI TOY LIBRARY, http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/belonging
(last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
148
Johnson, supra note 130.
137
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allow members to borrow clothes for free or for a membership fee, and
satisfy the desire for diversity and novelty in fashion without
overspending and overconsuming.149
Finally, access as a lifestyle choice is manifested in a new urbanplanning modality. WeWork, a company that provides a collaborative
workplace, has recently launched a housing project that supports a
flexible lifestyle.150 These projects, simply termed “WeLive,” provide
micro-housing units that are completely furnished, including
kitchenware and dishes, linens and bedding, and offer month-tomonth leases.151 The units are small but there are common areas and
common activities.152
Developers of micro-units generally assume that the people who
use them will spend considerable time outside the home.153 In
particular, developers assume that dwellers will not own cars but
instead depend on a sharing mechanism.154 According to John
Infranca, “[a] few recent micro-unit developments have successfully
negotiated substantial reductions to the required on-site parking in
exchange for providing car and bike sharing.”155 Micro-units in general
and the month-to-month lease offered by WeLive in particular
accommodate a flexible lifestyle. Dwellers are not attached to their
home, do not own a car, and can easily relocate. Access supports and
accommodates this lifestyle.
Finally, although access is a rising phenomenon, even users who
enthusiastically participate in the sharing economy have a strong
149

On clothing libraries, see Vedra Korobar, The Interconnection of Sustainability
and Collaborative Consumption: A Case Study of Clothing Libraries (Spring 2013)
(unpublished M.S. thesis, Lund University) (on file with Lund University library
system), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3800
323&fileOId=3800324.
150
See Katherine Clarke, “Dorm” Is the New Norm: Communal Living Spaces Offer Shortterm Deals for Young Professionals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2015, 4:33 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/real-estate/nyc-commune-style-microapartment-communities-article-1.2148150; WELIVE, https://www.welive.com (last
visited Jan. 4, 2017).
151
See Clarke, supra note 150. See also David Friedlander, WeLive Marries MicroApartments, Coworking, Magic, LIFE EDITED (July 28, 2014), http://lifeedited.com/weli
ve-marries-micro-apartments-coworking-magic; Daniel J. Sernovitz, Work Where You
Live? For WeWork Fans, There’s a Place for that in Crystal City, WASHINGTON BUS. J. (Mar.
16, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/201
5/03/work-where-you-live-for-wework-fans-theres-a-place.html.
152
Clarke, supra note 150. See John Infranca, Spaces for Sharing: Micro Units Amid the
Shift from Ownership to Access, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 21 (forthcoming 2017).
153
Id. at 7.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 17.
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preference for ownership in some cases.156 The tendency towards
ownership is strong in four categories: (1) intimate possessions, such
as a toothbrush; (2) frequently used objects—for example, a television;
(3) objects with emotional attachment, such as heirlooms; and (4) the
home.157 It is therefore important to note that no paradigm change
has occurred overthrowing ownership, and with it personhood and
stability; instead, we are witnessing the gradual and important
emergence of a more nuanced set of consumer choices.
B. Motivations for Access
A number of empirical studies have examined the motivations for
participation in the sharing economy.158 These studies often refer to
access as a primary example of collaborative consumption.159
A prominent study explored four motivations of online
participants in the sharing economy: sustainability, enjoyment,
economic benefits, and reputation.160 The study links motivations to
perception of the sharing economy and to intentions of use. It found
that although sustainability and enjoyment affect the attitude towards
the sharing economy, the economic benefits of saving time and money
are most likely to affect use intentions.161
Cait Lamberton and Randell Rose study access from a marketing
perspective, presenting a case of companies offering access services
such as commercial car sharing.162 They look into the costs and
benefits of access. Costs include membership fees, learning to use new
vehicles, and search costs.163 In addition, there is risk of consumer
rivalry over a limited supply of assets.164 The benefits include the value
of use, flexibility, saving on storage costs, and the psychological

156

See Cornelia Grimshorn & Marlene Jordan, Ownership: A Challenged
Consumer Ideal (May 27, 2015) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Lund University) (on file
with Lund University library system), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=dow
nloadFile&recordOId=5468892&fileOId=5468905.
157
Id. at 29–30.
158
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14; Hamari et al., supra note 129; Lamberton
& Rose, supra note 13; Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19; Grimshorn & Jordan, supra
note 156.
159
See supra note 158.
160
Hamari et al., supra note 129.
161
Id. at 2047. Sustainability did not affect use intentions, but enjoyment did have
some effect. Id. On the other hand, economic benefits had no effect on attitudes
towards the sharing economy. Id.
162
Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13.
163
Id. at 111.
164
Id. at 109.
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benefits of pursuing an anti-industry agenda.165
Studies on lending libraries show a more diverse set of
motivations.166 They point to advantages that are specific to more
communal forms of access. A qualitative study of clothing libraries in
Sweden found that users identify with specific garments even if they do
not own them.167 In addition, they identify with the project itself.168
They feel that borrowing clothes from a library specializing in quality
clothes makes them unique, unlike more traditional shoppers.169
Furthermore, users strive to be sophisticated consumers and
ecologically conscious.170
Lucie Ozanne and Paul Ballantine examined the social and
communal function of community-based toy libraries.171
They
identified four types of participants: the socialites who value the social
and communal benefits of toy libraries, market avoiders, anticonsumers, and passive members.172 To conclude, motivations for
access include not only saving costs but also flexibility and sociability.
C. Access: Property Without Personhood
1. Access as Flexibility and Detachment
Access is an alternative to ownership that allows for flexibility and
fluidity.
It breeds detachment to possession and focuses on
functionality. This characteristic should prompt scholars to re-evaluate
the role of property as personhood. The intricate relationship
between access and property as personhood has yet to be explored.
Times have changed. Personality and self-expression are shaped
and communicated in various mediums. Online social networks are a
prominent example.173 Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers further
explain: “As our online ‘brands’ define ‘who we are’ and ‘what we like,’
actual ownership becomes less important than demonstrating use or
use by association. We can now show status, group affiliation, and
belonging without necessarily having to buy physical objects.”174
Along with the rise of social networks, there is a change in lifestyle.
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 111.
Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19; Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156.
Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156, at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 33.
Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19.
Id. at 485.
BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 10, at 98.
Id.
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The Y-generation, or millennials, consists of people born after 1981.175
Millennials are technologically savvy and frequent technology users
from a young age.176 As a generation, they experienced years of
prosperity followed by an era of economic uncertainty and violence.177
They own less property.178 In addition, millennials prefer flexibility
over security.179 They prioritize choice and instant availability of
customized products.180
All these factors contribute to this
generation’s enthusiastic participation in the sharing economy and the
inclination to favor access over ownership.181
Access fits well with the tendency towards flexibility and an assetlight lifestyle.182 As opposed to the vision of property as shaping and
reflecting personhood,183 access is a choice to use without
attachment.184 Its primary function as an alternative to ownership is to
allow fluidity and the ability to experiment.185 Toys may be the perfect
example. Toys are usually associated with one’s identity.186 They foster

175
Ruth N. Bolton et al., Understanding Generation Y and their Use of Social Media: A
Review and Research Agenda, 24 J. SERV. MGMT. 245, 247 (2013).
176
Id. at 257. See also Jeongdoo Park & Dogan Gursoy, Generation Effects on Work
Engagement Among U.S. Hotel Employees, 31 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 1195 (2012).
177
Bolton et al., supra note 175, at 257. Susan Eisner, Managing Generation Y, S.A.M.
ADVANCED MGMT. J. 4, 6 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (“Though it is the most
affluent generation, some 16% of Gen Y grew up or is growing up in poverty. In its
post-Columbine, post-9/11, 24-hour media world, this latest generation has seen more
at an earlier age than prior generations have seen.”).
178
Ann Hayek, How Millennials Are Driving the Sharing Economy, MARKET REALIST
(Mar. 1, 2016, 1:06 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/millennials-drivingsharing-economy/.
179
Richey Piiparinen et al., The Fifth Migration: A Study of Cleveland Millennials 9–10
(Cleveland State Univ. Urban Publ’ns, Working Paper No. 1338, 2016),
http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/urban_facpub/1338. See also Bolton et al.,
supra note 175.
180
Piiparinen et al., supra note 179.
181
Hayek, supra note 178.
182
Id.
183
See discussion supra Part I.
184
Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 881 (“Instead of buying and owning things,
consumers want access to goods and prefer to pay for the experience of temporarily
accessing them.”).
185
Id. at 890 (“[O]ur informants talked of the lifestyle freedom experienced
because car sharing allows them to experiment and try different or new car models
that they would not have a chance to otherwise.”).
186
Compare Donald W. Ball, Toward a Sociology of Toys: Inanimate Objects, Socialization,
and the Demography of the Doll World, 8 SOC. Q. 447 (1967) (emphasizing the importance
of toys in the socialization process), with Joel Best, Too Much Fun: Toys as Social Problems
and the Interpretation of Culture, 21 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 197 (1998) (criticizing the
attribution of toys to identity, and the focus on objects rather than actors).
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gender187 and racial identification,188 and reflect personality traits such
as a tendency towards activity, imagination, or puzzle solving.189
Because toys and identity are perceived as linked, parents may be
reluctant to spend money on unconventional toy choices.190 Simply
put, they are afraid to buy toys their child will ultimately choose not to
play with.191 Moreover, children may be apprehensive that a certain toy
may reflect a different personality that they do not necessarily
endorse.192 For example, “[w]hen children are given a choice of a
variety of gender-typed and non-gender-typed toys, children
(especially boys) often choose toys based on gender associations.”193
Access creates a different behavioral pattern. When children
exchange toys in a toy lending library, there is no declaration of
identification and no financial commitment.194 Children are more
open to experimentation. As previously mentioned, boys are willing
to try toys associated with girls and less active children become more
physical in their play.195 This point is not purely empirical but rather
theoretical. It stresses the potential benefit of decoupling property use
from personhood. Once property is understood for its use function196
instead of its association with the self,197 there is more room for
exploration and change.
Adults also need to experiment and push the boundaries of their
187

Elizabeth Sweet, Boy Builders and Pink Princesses: Gender, Toys, and
Inequality over the Twentieth Century (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Davis).
188
Erika Engstrom, Toys and Games: Racial Stereotypes and Identity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF GENDER IN THE MEDIA 393 (Mary Kosut ed., 2012) (critically examining racial
representation in dolls).
189
Cf. Donna Fisher-Thompson et al., Toy Selection for Children: Personality and Toy
Request Influences, 33 SEX ROLES 239 (1995) (studying gender roles and personalities in
the selection of toys for a child).
190
Lucie K. Ozanne & Julie L. Ozanne, Parental Mediation of The Market’s Influence
on Their Children: Toy Libraries as Safe Havens, http://www.marketing.pamplin.vt.edu/
facultyFolder/julieOzanne/01socialwebsite/professional/conference%20papers%20
and%20sessions/2009%20Academy%20of%20Marketing%20Parental%20Mediation
%20of%20Market’s%20Influence%20on%20their%20children.htm (last visited Feb.
22, 2017) (noting that “because there was no financial commitment to borrowing toys,
the parents imposed few restrictions”).
191
Cf. Fisher-Thompson et al., supra note 189.
192
Cf. Ball, supra note 186.
193
Erica S. Weisgram et al., Pink Gives Girls Permission: Exploring the Roles of Explicit
Gender Labels and Gender-Typed Colors on Preschool Children’s Toy Preferences, 35 J. APPLIED
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 401 (2014).
194
Cf. Bardhi & Eckhart, supra note 14.
195
Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19.
196
Cf. Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, supra note 100.
197
See supra Part I.
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identity. Tool libraries allow people who are not skilled to learn and
experiment with fixing household appliances or personal vehicles.198
The learning environment and the freedom from financial
commitment support this type of experimentation.199
Another example is pets. Although the concept of access to pets
may seem confusing, BorrowMyDoggy is a game changer. It helps
match dog owners and dog lovers who want to spend time with a dog
without the long-term commitment.200 One can contemplate getting a
dog, or just spend time with a dog casually for a day or an evening.201
The activity could serve as a hobby or an opportunity to do more
exercise.202 All these benefits facilitate change with no strings attached.
These benefits potentially involve a variety of personal property,
depending on a person’s needs and preferences. Access can support
detachment from car models and dis-identification with personal
vehicles203 or household possessions. However, real property is a
different matter. Housing connotes stability and security.204 People are
less likely to experiment with permanent living arrangements. In the
sphere of housing, whether as owners or as lessees, attachment and
stability are prominent.205
Nonetheless, as the WeLive project shows, there is some room for
198

See About, TORONTO TOOL LIBR., http://torontotoollibrary.com/about-2/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2017).
199
Cf. Noelia Romero, Interview with Helen, Member #65, EDINBURGH TOOL LIBR.
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://edinburghtoollibrary.org.uk/news/.
200
The BorrowMyDoggy Story, BORROWMYDOGGY, https://www.borrowmydoggy.com
/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
201
See Waggy Tales Testimonials, Batman, Alex, and Lexie, BORROWMYDOGGY,
https://www.borrowmydoggy.com/testimonials/batman-alex-lexie (last visited Feb.
22, 2017) (dog borrowers also enjoy having a dog part time); Waggy Tales Testimonials,
Charlie, Marion, and June, BORROWMYDOGGY, https://www.borrowmydog
gy.com/testimonials/charlie-marion-june (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
202
See Waggy Tales Testimonials, Max, Josie, Alice, Sophie, and Lucy, BORROWMYDOGGY,
https://www.borrowmydoggy.com/testimonials/max-josie-alice-sophie-lucy
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2017).
203
Bardhi & Eckhart, supra note 14.
204
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 178, 187 (1944) (land “invests
man’s life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition of his physical
safety; it is the landscape and the seasons”). Fennell, supra note 100; Fox, The Meaning
of Home, supra note 46; Fox, Re-Possessing Home, supra note 46; Peñalver, Land Virtues,
supra note 93, at 830 (“[L]and is sufficiently stable that human transformations will
remain in place almost indefinitely unless human beings actively restore the land to its
prior form.”).
205
Peñalver, Land Virtues, supra note 93, at 830. Sheila Klebanow, How Much is
Enough? A Psychological Overview of Money and the Middle Class, in MONEY AND MIND 3, 6–
7 (Sheila Klebanow & Eugene L. Lowenkopf eds., 1991) (“For many, homeownership
connotes solidity, stability, self-esteem, putting down roots, and making a commitment
to oneself, or to marriage and family.”).
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experimentation in housing.206 Young, unattached individuals might
prefer a flexible living arrangement rather than commit to long-term
leases or to homeownership.207 Long-term housing is expensive and
requires financial stability.208 With the economic downturn and rising
costs of living, there is a decrease in the ability to own a home.209
Moreover, month-to-month leases foster mobility because dwellers are
not tied down to a community or to their homes. This alternative is
part of a lifestyle choice that includes living in a dense urban
environment,210 using car-sharing,211 spending time outside the
home,212 and the ability to quickly move from place to place.213
All these examples point to a function of property that has yet to
be fully theorized and analyzed,214 namely the role of property as
flexibility. This is a counterintuitive argument. Because property
often means attachment and connections,215 it seems implausible to
associate it with flexibility and mobility. Against the background of
property as stability,216 access as a form of property use allows
detachment and fluidity. It is important to note, however, that access
is not a typical property form: traditional property rights are secured
by title.217 Even the non-formalist and progressive accounts that
promote a more malleable understanding of property focus on
206

See Clarke, supra note 150.
Cf. id.; Eisner, supra note 177; Hayek, supra note 178.
208
Cf. Fennell, supra note 100, at 1051 (“[H]ouseholds that lack the financial
wherewithal or risk tolerance to take on such a large investment simply cannot become
homeowners.”).
209
Cf. Christopher L. Foote, Just the Facts: An Initial Analysis of Subprime’s Role in the
Housing Crisis, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 291 (2008).
210
Emily Compton, Could Micro-Apartments Help Ease Austin’s Housing Crunch?,
REPORTING TEX. (May 9, 2014), http://reportingtexas.com/could-micro-apartmentshelp-ease-austins-housing-crunch/ (quoting a developer who declared that micro-unit
residents have few belongings, “are part of the sharing economy,” and are “willing to
have less space in order to live in a cool neighborhood and have access to the amenities
of the city”). See also Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, Sharing Economy as an
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016).
211
Infranca, supra note 152.
212
Darcy Wintonyk & Lynda Steele, A 226 Sq. Ft. Solution to Living Large in
Vancouver, CTV BRITISH COLUMBIA (Aug. 17, 2012), http://bc.ctvnews.ca/a-226-sq-ftsolution-to-living-large-in-vancouver-1.917039 (“The city is your living room. The city
is your dining room. You don’t need to use your own resources to recreate all that
when you can just step out your door and enjoy a park, a beach, a restaurant, a café.”).
213
Bardhi et al., supra note 15.
214
See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99.
215
See supra Part I.
216
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4; Peñalver, Land Virtues, supra note 93.
217
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (describing an information
cost theory of property).
207
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attachment.218
Joseph William Singer, for example, supports
recognizing informal property rights based on the reliance interest.219
This vision of property as attachment to a place and a community is
further explained in his work:
Property gives us freedom and stability, provides a source of
wealth and well-being, the bases for creative work and useful
investment. Property provides a place to create a family life,
to nurture friendships, to rest, and to have fun. Property
allows us to be good neighbors and good citizens, and it
promotes various human values, including privacy, the
freedom to associate with others, religious liberty, tranquility,
and peace of mind.220
In order to decouple property from attachment, so ingrained in
our legal thinking, one should direct attention to property use. Access
is an alternative form of use, and not of property rights.221 Once we
accept use as the relevant prism for property as personhood, we can
begin to unpack the important role of property without personhood.
The role of flexibility is intricate. It is not the same as freedom.222
Flexibility derives from access as an alternative to ownership. As such,
it allows choice as opposed to stability. Flexibility is not simply the
ability to use a variety of assets. The argument is not an essentialist
view of consumer choices.223 People are not necessarily defined by
their choice to access;224 the claim is more nuanced. Flexibility
concerns the detachment from property and the focus on use instead
of continuing possession.
The choice of detachment is a relational choice as well. Property
provides a place for social interaction with family and friends.225 A
218

See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura
S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).
219
Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988);
JOSEPH W. SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES (6th ed. 2014)
(discussing informal sources of rights, reliance, social customs and norms). See also
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Informal Property Rights of Boomerang Children in the Home, 74 MD.
L. REV. 127 (2014) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Boomerang Children].
220
Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1054 (2009) [hereinafter Singer, Democratic Estates].
221
Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, supra note 100.
222
On property as promoting freedom, see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009). See also Larissa Katz, Ownership and Social Solidarity: A
Kantian Perspective, 17 LEGAL THEORY 119 (2011).
223
On identity and consumption, see Alan Warde, Consumption, Identity-Formation
and Uncertainty, 28 SOC. 877 (1994).
224
Cf. Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 16.
225
Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 220.
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stable location is important for sustaining relationships.226 If property
is less about personhood and stability, then ties might be looser. Yet,
access can support a broader spectrum of more casual networks.227
Of course, one could argue that access can be classified as
fungible property—as per Radin’s taxonomy—and therefore does not
present a true challenge to contemporary property theory.228 However,
according to Radin, both categories—fungible and personhood
property—refer to property owned or leased for long periods.229 Even
fungible property can evoke stability and security.230 More importantly,
access is a choice that rejects at least partially the limiting function of
property as personhood. It represents resistance to traditional notions
of property.
Nonetheless, flexibility is not for everyone. Young people,
especially Gen-Yers, are more inclined toward property fluidity than
previous generations.231 Not everyone is looking for mobility. Access
as a general lifestyle choice fits the unattached. People with strong ties
to the community, who have caretaking responsibilities, are likely to
prefer stability.232 Nonetheless, more nuanced choices will fit a variety
of people. Flexibility with personal, as opposed to real, property might
be more easily integrated into people’s lives. At the end of the day,
most people would prefer a mixture of personhood and flexibility,
embracing both models of property use.233
2. Critiques of Property without Personhood
Access, or property without personhood, creates vulnerabilities.
The Kantian notion of property focuses on independence both from
other people and from the state.234 Access epitomizes the opposite: it
226

Kreiczer-Levy, Boomerang Children, supra note 219.
Id.
228
See Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 6, at 88.
229
Radin, supra note 1, at 960.
230
Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4 (discussing stability without limiting it to
a particular type of property).
231
Piiparinen et al., supra note 179.
232
Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 220, at 1054 (explaining the pluralist values
of property, including stability and community).
233
Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 26–27.
234
See Katz, supra note 222, at 126 (“For Kant, all private rights are derived from
our basic right to independence, which for Kant means the capacity to set and pursue
our own purposes, and so the freedom not to be subject to the choices of others.”);
RIPSTEIN, supra note 222, at 91 (“[I]f someone interferes with your property, they
thereby interfere with your purposiveness.”).
Others stress dependency or
interdependency as a core feature of property. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES
AND INSTITUTIONS 37–57 (2011); Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, Properties of
Communities, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127 (2009). Relational accounts insist that
227
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is profoundly dependent.235 It is dependent on a pool of resources
provided by owners, the state or the community.236 Some access-based
enterprises rely on an online platform to mediate transactions.237
These platforms gather information and might compromise privacy.238
In addition, access as a way of life is risky. Once the accessor becomes
ill, old or in need of care, stability and long-term relations trump
flexibility and mobility.239
For this reason, access is mostly chosen as one component in an
overall choice of property use. It showcases the direction of new
engagements with property, but it is unlikely to subsume the entire
property project.
A different critique is that access is never fully detached. When
people use an asset casually for a number of times, they become
accustomed to it.240 They tend to prefer it, and ultimately get attached
to this preferred possession.241 If one borrows her neighbor’s drill, she
will be inclined to use it again provided she had a good experience.242
If this is true, access will eventually morph into a more familiar form of
property use that builds on ongoing attachment, yet lacks the security
of formal ownership or a lease.
Although complete flexibility and fluidity are perhaps
unattainable,243 access provides the greatest potential for unattached
property constructs relationships and does not just set boundaries. Jennifer Nedelsky,
Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1991).
235
Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 27.
236
Id.
237
Cf. Einat Albin, Required Intimacies: What Airbnb and Domestic Work Share
in Common 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[I]ndeed,
technological development has enabled the progression of online platforms that
promote sharing and collaboration.”); Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, supra note 10.
238
See, e.g., Gabriel R. Schlabach, Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and the Stored
Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677 (2015).
239
Cf. Martha Alberston Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable: Rethinking The Nature of
Individual and Social Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 85 (2012) (“If someone is very
young, profoundly ill or disabled, or very old, we may not be comfortable demanding
they conform to the mandates of self-sufficiency and independence.”).
240
Chenchen Liao et al., The Roles of Habit and Web Site Quality in E-Commerce, 26
INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 469 (2006) (noting that intentions of continued use depend on
perceived usefulness, trust, and habit); Walter A. Woods, Psychological Dimensions of
Consumer Behavior, 24 J. MARKETING 15 (1960) (discussing the force of habit in
consumer choices).
241
This is especially true considering the costs of learning to use new possessions.
See Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13, at 111.
242
Id. It is costly to scout for new products whenever accessors decide to use
property again (“‘[S]earch costs’ are created through the money or effort needed to
determine which product to purchase or which sharing program to enter.”). Id.
243
This is because of the human tendency to favor repetition. Henk Aart et al.,
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property use. Transitions and change are less complicated and easier
with access, as compared with ownership or long-term possession.244 It
also creates more potential for experimentation, depending on the
personality of the accessor and his or her motivations for using access.
Finally, the lack of attachment might mean disregard for the
property, including lack of proper maintenance and neglect.245 In
other words, if the property is not mine, I do not have sufficient
incentives to care for it. A study of Zipcar users supports this claim.246
Yet unlike the access offered by business companies who own the
property,247 communal access and peer-to-peer access create a reduced
risk. In lending libraries, people feel a commitment to take care of the
property for the good of the community.248 In peer-to-peer markets,
the reciprocal reputation system creates an incentive for cautious and
attentive behavior.249
To conclude, access provides an alternative property form that
emphasizes flexibility and mobility. This attribute has benefits and
costs, but it ultimately represents a choice of being detached from
property. Alongside property as personhood, there is also reason to
recognize property without personhood.

Predicting Behavior From Actions in the Past: Repeated Decision Making or a Matter of Habit?,
28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1355, 1355 (1998) (“When behavior is repeated and
becomes habitual, it is guided by automated cognitive processes, rather than by
elaborate decision processes.”).
244
See Cooter, supra note 97; Desan, supra note 98.
245
On physical damages to property, see Christian Witting, Physical Damage in
Negligence, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189 (2002).
246
Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 889.
247
See id. at 891.
248
Lucie K. Ozanne & Julie L. Ozanne, A Child’s Right to Play: The Social Construction
of Civic Virtues in Toy Libraries, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 264, 271 (2011) (“Very
young children learn that the library toys are collective goods that need to be enjoyed
while respecting the next user.”). In addition, toy libraries sanction mistreatment of
toys. See KARIORI TOY LIBR., http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/borrowing (last visited
Jan. 7, 2017) (collecting a $5 fine for all missing, lost, or destroyed pieces); see also BOX
HILL AREA TOY LIBR., http://boxhillareatoylibrary.org.au/toys/borrowing/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2017) (charging a fine for broken or missing toys).
249
Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational
Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem” (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2015),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Thierer-Lemons-Problem.pdf.
See, e.g.,
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13/how-do-reviews-work (last visited
June 30, 2016); TURO, https://turo.com/trust-and-safety (last visited June 30, 2016);
NEIGHBORGOODS, http://neighborgoods.net/faq (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). See also
Eyal Ert et al., Trust and Reputation in the Sharing Economy: The Role of Personal Photos in
Airbnb, 43 NA ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 518 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=26241
81.
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III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

There are three possible legal approaches to the property without
personhood phenomenon: to reject flexibility as working against the
public policy of stability in property; to reevaluate the property as
personhood legal protection; or, to distinguish between the two
categories while supporting both when appropriate. This Part explains
these possibilities and explores their merit.
The first direction is to insist that stability and property are
inseparably linked. It is a governmental interest to foster stability, and
property is one important means of achieving this goal.250 This is
especially true regarding the homeownership debate.251 Homeowners,
arguably the epitome of stability, view renters as failing to demonstrate
The connection of stability and
community commitment.252
commitment supports the view that flexibility is hazardous. If
flexibility as a characteristic of property threatens the notion of
stability, then the law must limit the option to engage with property
without personhood.
Legally, such a position implies stringent regulation coupled with
strong disincentives for access and access-like activities. Regulation
today encourages users to choose ownership or other forms of longterm possession because there are strong disincentives working against

250

Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: a Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV.
62, 66 (2004) (arguing that governments promote homeownership as creating stability
in order to shift the burden of welfare to the family). It has similarly been suggested
that home ownership ideology promotes a property-based citizenship, privileging
home ownership over public and rental housing. See RICHARD RONALD, THE IDEOLOGY
OF HOME OWNERSHIP: HOMEWORKER SOCIETIES AND THE ROLE OF HOUSING (2008). See
also Ann Dupuis & David C. Thorns, Home, home ownership security and the search for
ontological security, 46 SOC. REV. 24 (1998) (arguing that the home is a site of constancy
and ontological security).
251
Lynda Cheshire et al., The Politics of Housing Consumption: Renters as Flawed
Consumers on a Master Planned Estate, 47 URB. STUD. 2597, 2598 (2010) (arguing that
renters are seen as failing in three aspects of social life: “aesthetical conduct, ethical
values and community commitment”).
252
Id.
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access.253 Examples include insurance policies,254 taxes,255 and business
permits.256 This position supports such rules and would even advocate
expanding this approach to more areas of regulation.
The advantages of this approach are clear. It preserves current
understandings of the function of property, and supports stability,
freedom and familial ties.257 However, it downplays the role of
flexibility, mobility and change in property use, and their potential to
promote autonomy for users. More importantly, property without
personhood creates an alternative to the traditional view of property.
This alternative provides a prism for criticizing and reevaluating the
stagnation that afflicts contemporary property visions.
The second direction takes the opposite path. If property as
flexibility is a rising phenomenon, it could be taken to mean the
demise of property as personhood. Put differently, considering the
popularity of access, one could argue that attachment is no longer

253

See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99.
Ingrid Ballús-Armet et al., Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Exploring Public Perception and
Market Characteristics in the San Francisco Bay Area, California, 2416 J. TRANSP. RES. BOARD
27, 28 (2014) (discussing how personal vehicle insurance policies are generally invalid
when the owners give access to users, as this activity would count as commercial
activity). See also Ron Lieber, Share a Car, Risk Your Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/your-money/auto-insurance/enthusia
stic-about-car-sharing-your-insurer-isnt.html?_r=0. Jay MacDonald, Auto Insurance Risks
of Car Sharing, BANKRATE (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insuran
ce/auto-insurance-risks-car-sharing-1.aspx#ixzz3kxcDf3Da. But see CAL. INS. CODE §
11580.24 (West 2015) (“No private passenger motor vehicle insured by its owner
pursuant to a policy of insurance subject to Section 11580.1 or 11580.2 shall be
classified as a commercial vehicle, for-hire vehicle, permissive use vehicle, or livery
solely because its owner allows it to be used for personal vehicle sharing . . . .”); OR.
REV. STAT. § 742.595 (2015) (“An owner’s insurance policy for a private passenger
motor vehicle may not be canceled, voided, terminated, rescinded or nonrenewed
solely on the basis that the vehicle has been made available for personal vehicle sharing
pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program that is in compliance with the
provisions of ORS 742.585 to 742.600.”).
255
Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989
(2016) (arguing there is no need for special taxation rules for the sharing economy,
but conceding that it would be complicated for nonprofessionals, especially regarding
cost deduction and apportionment of expenses). See also Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking
the sharing economy: An independent review, UK DEP’T OF BUS., INNOVATION & SKILL 21
(2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-the-sharing-econ
omy-independent-review (recommending “a guide to tax in the sharing economy, and
an online tax calculator to help users of sharing economy services to easily work out
how much tax they are liable to pay”).
256
Cf. Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the HomeBusiness Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1201–02 (2001) (noting the problem
of home business).
257
See supra notes 213–219 and accompanying text.
254
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important for human flourishing.258 The special treatment of
personhood property should be scrutinized and reevaluated. This
direction finds support in previous studies questioning the validity of
property as personhood.259 Legal protection of personhood property
includes takings law,260 eviction rules,261 criminal law,262 and privacy in
the home.263 In addition, property tax and bankruptcy rules protect
personal-use property.264 According to this approach, all these rules
will be reconsidered as the elevation of personhood property is

258

Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46, at 1106 (“Following Radin’s
landmark article, a generation of legal scholars adopted the personhood perspective
and focused in particular on the role of the home in human flourishing.”).
259
See supra Part I.B.1.
260
Following the case Kelo v. The City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)—that
upheld a taking of a residential home for a private redevelopment project—several
states enacted counter-legislation. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(b) (requiring “acquiring
by eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of conveying it to a
private person” unless it is necessary for public health or safety reasons). Indiana
requires a 150% market value compensation for such a condemnation. IND. CODE §
32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (2008).
261
Just cause eviction rules serve to protect occupational rights of tenants in their
home. See, e.g., Symposium, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 534–35 (1984) (discussing common types of
just-cause eviction statutes); Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws:
Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 833–35 (1983) (providing examples of
“good cause” justifications for evictions and explaining their treatment).
262
See Barros, supra note 44, at 262 (noting that the punishment for invasion of a
home generally exceeds the penalties “imposed for invasions of other types of
property”). In addition, the home as a castle doctrine provides that a person need not
retreat if attacked at home. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914) (“It is not
now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to
retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is under
no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home. . . . Flight
is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home.”).
263
Stern, The Inviolate Home, supra note 44. See also Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The
Costs of the Fourth Amendment: Home Searches and Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3
(2009).
264
2009 US MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE 9, 45–46 (Fred Conklin ed. 2009)
[hereinafter MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE], (describing how property tax law in most
states distinguishes between personal property used for business purposes and
property for personal use, and employs a personal property tax ad valorem but exempts
personal use property, household goods or furniture). See, e.g. id. at 10–39 (describing
the situation in Delaware as including family bible, school books, family library, family
pictures, pianos and sewing machines). Yet, “[t]his provision shall not apply to persons
who keep sewing machines for sale or hire.” See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(c). See
also MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE at 10–19, 10–24 (Alabama and Alaska); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. 651-121(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (discussing all necessary household
furnishings, appliances, clothing and books that are used by the debtor and his family).
Federal bankruptcy exemptions include a car, household furniture and goods, and
books that are personally used. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d) (LexisNexis 2016); JAMES J.
BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT 10-1, 10-9 (Supp. 2010).

KREICZER-LEVY (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

PROPERTY WITHOUT PERSONHOOD

4/16/2017 3:27 PM

803

obsolete or unnecessary.
The problem with this approach is that the mere existence of an
alternative does not negate the role of property as personhood.
Property without personhood points to one drawback of the
personhood argument: its tendency towards stagnation and the
possible restriction of identity.265 It does not support or undercut the
theory on its merits, but suggests an alternative that fits certain people
at different points in their lives.
The third direction takes seriously both flexibility and stability as
being part of a rich and nuanced property regime. Property as
personhood and property without personhood play different roles in
promoting autonomy and flourishing. Property law should recognize
demographic differences and human diversity. Three implications
follow: protection of personal property depending on its actual
contribution to self-development and personhood; reconsideration of
regulative barriers to access; and evaluation of the institutional design
supporting access.
Without adopting property as personhood in full, this direction
recognizes the centrality of attachment, personhood and stability in
certain types of property. As mentioned above, even passionate
adopters of access still prefer to own certain types of property, most
notably the home.266 The vision of the home as a special locus for
individual autonomy and dignity,267 freedom and privacy,268 is relevant
even in an age of access. Moreover, the home is also important as a
relational space hosting a variety of intimate interactions.269
Nonetheless, the protection of personhood cannot undercut
access. A second important implication requires legal regulation to
recognize access.270 The obstacles described earlier in tax, permit and
insurance law need to be removed.271 This is not a call for immediate
regulation. In crafting rules, there are many relevant considerations,
including positive and negative externalities.272 However, addressing
265

See supra Part I.B.4.
Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156, at 29 and accompanying text.
267
See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views
of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2972 (2006).
268
Lisa M. Austin, Person, Place or Thing? Property and The Structuring of Social
Relations, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 445, 450 (2010).
269
Kreiczer-Levy, Boomerang Children, supra note 219, at 138.
270
Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 32.
271
See supra notes 251–254 and accompanying text.
272
For example, effects on neighborhoods, the community, and the environment
are key elements. See, e.g., Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1579,
1589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that preserving residential character and
266
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these obstacles with the understanding of property as flexibility in
mind is crucial.
Access is a general category based on the consumer’s perspective
that includes the experience of short-term and uncommitted use.273
However, the property could be accessed in various institutional
settings, each with its own merits and faults. The owner of the property
can be a commercial company, a private owner, the state or the
community. This Article offers a preliminary account that compares
these different institutions according to their contribution to flexibility
and mobility.
There are four main institutional settings that provide assets or
resources to be accessed by users: commercial companies, city or statesupported services, community resources, and peer-to-peer markets.
In the commercial company model, a user chooses a vehicle from a
fleet of cars owned by the company.274 The transaction concerns
commercial property and property designed for personal use.275
Advantages include accessibility of vehicles,276 variety,277 a more
regulated model, and the usual advantages of access such as saving
storage costs and the costs of ownership.278 On the other hand,
commercial access with regard to cars is characterized by a lack of
reciprocity.279 There is no sense of community or commitment
between users.280 Users typically neglect to fill gas tanks for the next
user, and they sometimes smoke in the car.281 Bardhi and Eckhardt
conclude that Zipcar does not conform to the vision of collaborative,
community stability is a legitimate government interest in regulating the sharing
economy); Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d 1083, 1084 (1993) (upholding a
local ordinance and stating there is a legitimate government interest “in securing
affordable housing for permanent residents and in preserving the character and
integrity of residential neighborhoods”). Cf. Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal
Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 2–3 (2012).
273
See generally supra Part II.
274
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886.
275
See Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 6, at 79 (“Because the owner
in Zipcar is a commercial company, there is no consumption property involved in the
transaction. Their cars are business inventory par excellence. In Turo, at least some
of the vehicles available are personal cars rented out by individual owners when they
are not using them.”).
276
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886 (explaining that Zipcars are located
close to a person’s residence or place of work).
277
Id. (“Zipcar has around 30 car models in its fleet, from basic functional models,
such as Toyota trucks, to luxury brands such as BMW, to green cars such as the Toyota
Prius.”).
278
Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13, at 111.
279
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 891–92.
280
Id.
281
Id.
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altruistic and sustainable consumption.282 There is a certain level of
flexibility that comes from access to a fleet of cars spread out over many
locations.283 However, companies usually tend to encourage a brand
community and identification with specific cars.284 They attempt to
foster attachment rather than flexibility.
A different model relies on governmental or nonprofit oversight.
Bike sharing is a good example. Providers include governments, quasigovernmental transport agencies, and universities.285 Paul DeMaio
explains the benefits and costs of each provider. In a governmental
model, the local government operates the service and gains control
over it, but it also maintains the liability and might be less
experienced.286 In the transport agency model, there is a quasigovernmental organization that provides services to the jurisdiction.287
The jurisdiction benefits from the experience of the provider without
bearing the costs.288 However, the provider is not subject to
competition by other qualified operators.289 The university model
expands intra-campus service without relying on outside sources.290
However, the general population does not benefit from the service and
there might be compatibility issues with the locality.291 The nonprofit
model benefits the locality because it removes liability, yet this model
often relies on the public sector for most of its funding.292
The governmental model today is mostly notable for
transportation services.293 If considered more broadly, the model
benefits from an equal distribution of goods and services and overall
public planning,294 but it also creates dependency on the state for
supplying the property, and less flexibility.295
282

Id. at 894.
See ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2017); CAR2GO; www.car
2go.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
284
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886, 888.
285
DeMaio, supra note 124, at 45.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 45–47.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 47.
291
DeMaio, supra note 124, at 47.
292
Id.
293
Id. at 45–47.
294
Cf. Mishori, supra note 112.
295
Cf. Reich, supra note 222, at 273. As Charles Reich explains, “[t]he institution
called property guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the
state. . . . [I]n a society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to control a
particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuality.”
283
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A community model operates as a common resource of members.
Members pay membership fees296 and can use the resources as long as
they follow specific borrowing rules, and in some cases perform
responsibilities shared by members such as “assisting the librarian with
issues and returns, helping new members and processing any new
toys.”297 This model builds on detachment from the property and
flexibility of use, but it also involves social involvement and
participation.298 For this reason, access to property in the community
model avoids the potential commodification of relationships that is
sometimes associated with the peer-to-peer model.299
In the peer-to-peer model, a private owner rents out his personal
property to a user. Both the owner and the user benefit from the
excess capacity of the property.300 This model is often mediated by an
online platform that significantly lowers transaction costs.301 Peer-topeer access combines a contract between the owner and the user, and
the platform that facilitates the transaction and is responsible towards
both owners and users.302 This model avoids the problem of negative
reciprocity associated with commercial companies303 because it directly
connects owners and users.304 Most platforms include a reputation
mechanism that offers reviews not only for the owner and the property,
but also for the accessor.305 In addition, such a model provides more
flexibility because it offers a plethora of available options without
promoting brand association or consumer loyalty to a specific
company.306 However, these markets may replace neighborly assistance
with monetary transactions,307 sparking a concern with regard to
296

Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19, at 488.
See, e.g., KARORI TOY LIBR., http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/belonging (last
visited Feb. 20, 2017).
298
See Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19.
299
Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 41.
300
See Benkler, supra note 110. See also Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra
note 6.
301
Id.
302
See, e.g., RENTYTHING, https://www.rentything.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2017)
(describing the role of owner, user and platform).
303
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 891–92 and accompanying text.
304
See Ghose, supra note 123.
305
See supra note 248. See also Rachel Botsman, The currency of the new economy is
trust,
TEDGLOBAL
(Sept.
24,
2012),
http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_
trust (discussing a case where the owner decided to get a cat to avoid a negative review
concerning mice on the premises).
306
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 893, for Zipcar’s attempts at brand
association.
307
Cf. Paul Webley & Stephen E. G. Lea, The Partial Unacceptability of Money in
297
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relationship commodification.308
To sum up, the third direction for legal policy seeks a balance
between access and ownership to provide both security and flexibility.
Yet a property regime requires lawmakers to consider the institutional
framework of access, to ensure that flexibility and mobility are
achieved.
IV. CONCLUSION
Property as personhood has been incredibly influential in
modern legal theory.
However, the changing demographics,
globalization and the sharing economy have created an alternative
form of property use. Possession of property provides attachment,
security and stability, but it is also limiting. It constrains identity to a
predetermined image. Access as a form of property use represents
property without personhood, which allows individuals to experiment
and push the boundaries of their identity. As this Article has argued,
this alternative function of use has to be seriously considered by
property theory. This Article has explained the benefits and
detriments of property without personhood and presented its
theoretical significance.

Repayment for Neighborly Help, 46 HUM. REL. 65 (1993).
308
Cf. Barry Wellman & Scot Wortley, Different Strokes from Different Folks: Community
Ties and Social Support, 96 AM. J. SOC. 558 (1990) (addressing the services provided by
physically accessible ties).

